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The Taiwanese flour industry’s capacity utilization rate has maintained an extremely low
level of 40% for more than 20 years. This article sets up a two-stage game model and uses
the strategic effect of the firm’s capital investment on its rivals’ outputs to explain the
nature of this excess capacity. The model is tested with panel data from the Taiwanese flour
industry by using non-linear three-stage least squares. The evidences indicate that a large
capacity built in the past could have been used strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs,
in the context of a concerted action among the incumbent firms.
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I. Introduction
In 2000, an antitrust case brought Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC,
hereafter) against the flour industry association, which was alleged to eliminate
price competition by collusive arrangements. The most interesting part of the
case is that the industry has maintained an extremely low level of capacity
utilization rate at around 40%-50% for more than 20 years.1 If the period of
20 years is considered as long-run in terms of economics, flour firms should
have had enough time to adjust their capacity. Faced with such a contradiction,
* E-mail address: tcma@cc.kuas.edu.tw. Address: Tay-Cheng Ma, No. 16, Lane 121, Yung-
Nien Street, Kaohsiung 807, Taiwan. The author is indebted to two anonymous referees
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 According to Chen (1986), excess capacity has been built, at least, since 1980s.154 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
economists might want to check the determination of capacity with a more
detailed investigation of the IO model.
Recent game theoretic contributions, such as Osborne and Pitchik (1983,
1986, 1987), Allen, Deneckere, Faith, and Kovenock (2000), and Roller and
Sickles (2000) emphasize the strategic effect of capacity. These models have
a two-stage setup in common. In the first stage, firms make a capacity decision
followed by a price-setting game in the second stage. The stage-one variable
(capacity) is used to develop a strategic effect to influence other firms’ stage-
two decision (price). Higher investment in stage one induces a softer action by
other firms in stage two. Following this line of argument, this article introduces
an expected effect of the firm’s first-stage investment on its rivals’ outputs in
the second stage. We find that a large capacity built in period one can be used
strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs in period two. This leads to an
overinvestment in the first stage and causes the misallocation of resources.
Based on this line of argument, this article tries to build a model to explain
the excess capacity in Taiwanese flour market. The model is also tested with
panel data from the industry by using non-linear three-stage least squares.
The data used for the empirical investigation are given in a report by the
TFTC (2001) about collusive behavior in the Taiwanese flour market. The
report provides detailed data on prices, outputs, and fixed capacity as well as
a great deal of more qualitative information which is valuable in interpreting
those data. The information in the report is derived directly from the working
of a real-world cartel. Its main drawback is that it is related only to 5 years,
and standard econometric models are difficult to be applied, in particular to
the estimation of a demand function. Nevertheless, we hope to demonstrate
that some quite strong conclusions can still be drawn, in particular on the
extent to which the excess capacity reduces industry output. The empirical
evidences are consistent with those proposed by the model. Flour firms expect
that the long-term effects of their capacity investment may act to deter their
competitors’ outputs. Besides, a certain amount of collusion exists in the
second stage. The results are robust to the sensitivity analysis.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section II contains a brief discussion
on some stylized facts of the Taiwanese flour industry. Section III contains a
theoretical model to discuss the effect of excess capacity on collusion. Section
IV and V present the major empirical results.155 STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND EXCESS CAPACITY
II. Stylized Facts in the Flour Market
This section sets out briefly some stylized facts about the flour market in
Taiwan.
- Production. Flour is a homogeneous product. It is shipped in barrels to
grocers who in turn package the flour for final users without any identification
of the manufacturers. Price therefore tends toward uniformity, and flour firms
compete in quantity in the market. In addition, the demand for flour is not
seasonal.
Flour is produced via a simple process and flour firms use a common
technology. Wheat is transformed at a fixed, and generally accepted,
coefficient into flour. As TFTC (2001) notes, the production of one kilogram
of flour needs 1.37 kilograms of wheat on average. This coefficient remains
constant over the sample period. Besides, the value-added of production of
flour is quite low. Estimates of TFTC (2001) show that, in 1994-1998,
material (wheat) cost comprised 69% of the flour price.2 Since wheat is the
main variable input and the input-output coefficient is fixed, we can translate
this into the assumption that, over the relevant range of outputs, average cost
of production is constant as output varies, and that it is equal to the marginal
production cost.
- Entry. Although the production of flour is quite simple, a quota system
instituted by the flour industry association seems to rule out entry almost
completely. Since Taiwan does not produce any wheat, all of the production
materials have to be imported from abroad (mainly from the US and Australia)
and are subject to the high cost of transport. TFTC report shows that economies
of scale to import wheat can be achieved only when firms use a 50,000 tonnage
vessel for each voyage. However, this figure is far beyond the material needs
of a single firm. Thus, flour firms have to procure and ship wheat jointly
under the supervision of the flour industry association. This gives the
association an opportunity to block entry by not allowing new entrants to join
the procurement group through a quota system. Since 1990, there has been
only one entrant (Global Flour Company), who joined the industry in 1998
2 For an individual flour firm, therefore, almost the only possible cost advantage depends
on its procurement price of the wheat input.156 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
and was a joint venture of several incumbent flour firms in Southern Taiwan.
Besides, the 20% tariff rate for the flour is too high to allow for imports, and
exports are rare, too. Thus, the collusive behavior of the incumbents has not
been influenced by the threat of new entry for decades.
- Concentration. Though the industry contains 32 firms, the TFTC report
shows that the leading 10 firms control 75% of the Taiwanese flour market.
Table 1 shows that the market share is about the same across incumbent firms,
except for firm 10. Although TFTC (2001) does not indicate firms’ name to
protect their secret information in the business, we can still identify that firm
10 is President Company, which happens to be the largest producer in the
market. According to TFTC (2001), President Company did not conform to
the cartel occasionally, and even threatened the cartel by bringing together
several small firms to import the wheat by themselves so as to obtain more
quotas to import the wheat. For Table 1, numbers between parentheses stand
for the statistics of mean and standard deviation for the sample excluding
President Company. These figures show that market share is quite the same
across the remaining 9 firms.
- Capacity. As the production technology for flour is quite simple and
experiences little innovation, the capacity to produce flour is relatively long-
lived. Generally speaking, the machinery in flour firms could last for at least
15 years. According to Ma (2004a), the depreciation outlay takes up only 5%
of the flour price.3 Thus, the cost to build an excess capacity to facilitate the
cartel is not expensive.
The capacity utilization rates of flour firms have been maintained at an
extremely low level of 40%-50% between 1994 and 1998, which were by far
lower than the level of 80% for the manufacturing industry during the same
period. This evidence indicates a huge excess capacity at the industry level
that shapes a credible threat, since firms can easily dump a large amount of
output on the market to punish the cheaters. As entrants could not get the
wheat quotas issued by the association, either, it follows that incumbent firms
do not invest in excess capacity to preclude outsiders but to restrict the behavior
of their established rivals within the dominant group.
Although Table 1 shows that two of these flour firms had capacity
3 As we mentioned above, the main cost to produce is the wheat input.157 STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND EXCESS CAPACITY
Table 1. Firms’ Production, Market share, and Cost (1994-1998, Yearly
Averages)
Production Market Capacity Utilization Wheat cost
(ton) share (%) (ton) rate (%) (NT$/kg)
1 33,760 4.68 100,980 33.43 7.30
2 33,853 4.69 114,000 29.70 6.24
3 34,564 4.79 87,120 39.67 8.13
4 35,507 4.92 90,000 39.45 6.63
5 36,543 5.01 94,900 38.51 6.60
6 36,913 5.11 109,500 33.71 7.09
7 41,199 5.71 86,400 47.68 7.09
8 53,629 7.43 98,940 54.20 6.85
9 53,713 7.44 69,677 77.09 6.64
10 110,412 15.30 128,986 85.60 6.71
Mean 47,009 6.51 98,050 47.90 6.93
(39,965) (5.53) (94,613) (43.72)
Standard dev. 23,546 3.27 16,623 19.10 0.52
(8,087) (1.12) (13,339) (14.59)
Notes: The figures are yearly averages between 1994 and 1998 for each firm. TFTC data
does not expose firms’ name so as to protect their privacies. Numbers between parentheses
exclude the data corresponding to President Company. The industry output to calculate the
individual firm’s market shares comes from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The source
of all the other data is TFTC (2001).
Firm
utilization rates above 70%, readers being familiar with the Taiwanese flour
market can easily identify that these two firms are President Company and
Lien-Hwa Company. These two firms are separately owned by the integrated
food processing conglomerate with a portfolio of businesses spanning
downstream in the industry, and most of their products are used within the
conglomerate and not traded in the market.
- Cartel members. Although we have identified 10 major firms between 1994
and 1998, the TFTC detailed data contains only nine of them. We do not have
the cost and capital stock data for firm 4. Thus, the empirical investigation158 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
contains only the collusive behaviors among these 9 dominant firms, and the
remaining 23 firms are ignored. These dominant firms are hypothesized to
behave collusively to restrict output among them. In addition, the excess
capacity is used to restrict cheating within the dominant group. Since we
focus on dominant firms, and cheating probably happens, then the remaining
23 firms are implicitly irrelevant.
III. A Model of Competition for the Flour Industry
In this section, a two-stage game model is set up to deal with the competition
issue in flour market. The framework is inspired by Roller and Sickles (2000)
and Dixon (1986). Ma (2004b) also investigates the relationship between
strategic effects and conjectural variations under this framework. Flour firms
simultaneously decide the fixed factor input (capital stock) in the first stage
and then choose the variable factor input (such as wheat or labor) so as to
resolve quantity in the second stage. Thus, capital is treated as an endogenous
variable and is determined in the first stage, which affects both the production
cost and market competition in the second stage. This specification allows
for the possibility of a semicollusive market where firms compete in a long-
run variable, such as capital investment, and collude with respect to a short-
run variable, such as quantity or market share. For an individual firm, our
concern is about the effect of long-run capital investment on its rivals’ short-
run output decision.
We begin by specifying a quantity-setting game in which each flour firm
produces a homogeneous commodity and faces an inverse linear demand
function of the form:4
where P is the price and Q is the quantity demanded, and in equilibrium the
market quantity demanded equals the sum of the outputs of the individual
4 These assumptions could be justified by the technical structure of the industry that we
mentioned in section II. For instance, the output of industry is homogeneous and the
wholesale price is uniform across firms. Therefore, the inverse demand function applies
well.
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Following Roller and Sickles (2000), we assume that cost structure is
used as a channel through which the first and the second stage decisions have
an effect on  firms’ profitability. In the first stage (long-run), firms can vary
their cost through the adjustment in capital stock. However, in the second
stage (short-run), cost relies only on variable inputs, which is determined by
the quantity produced,5given the capacity determined in the first stage. Thus,
the cost structure can be specified as follows:
where li is the variable factor input, 
LR
i C is the long-run cost function which
amounts to short-run cost ()
SR
i C plus fixed cost (ri ki). Note that, given a capital
stock  ()
0
ii kk = and a fixed capital price ()
0 , ii rr =
SR
i C is determined only by
qi, which is a function of li. In the second stage, firms choose li to determine
qi. However, in the first stage, capital turns out to be variable and firms can
change their cost by purchasing ki at a given price 
0. i r
We now solve the two-stage game in a standard way. First, each firm
chooses li to maximize its profit in the second stage:
Given a predetermined capital level (k0), the short-run production cost of
firm i ()
SR
ii Cq is determined by the variable input li which gives the total
variable cost (wili) at a factor price wi. Assuming that wi is exogenously
determined, the first order condition for (3) is given by:
5 Thus, the cost in the second stage can be considered as the short-run variable cost.
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is the conjectural variation. As stated earlier,
QJ is the output of other firms in the same industry.
If we were interested in both the existence and pattern of interdependence,
it would be adequate to allow each firm to have different conjectural variations.
However, as we are only interested in the existence of oligopolistic
interdependence, it is sufficient to evaluate the aggregate output response of
the other n -1 firms anticipated by firm i. Thus, following Roller and Sickles
(2000) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we assume that qi = q (i.e., that the
conjectural variation is the same across all the flour firms). In the special case
of Cournot behavior, q    =   0. Furthermore, under perfect competition q    = -1,
and under a perfect collusive solution, q    =  n - 1 . This provides a basis for
testing these hypotheses in the next section. We then rewrite (4) as:
Since the price of the variable factor is equal to its marginal revenue










into (5) and use the equilibrium condition












e =-  is the
price elasticity of demand. Equation (6) represents an oligopoly mark-up
formula that is customarily used to measure market power and is determined
by market share si, price elasticity e and market conduct parameter q.
Econometrically, q can be estimated as a free parameter and interpreted as
“the average collusiveness of conduct”. In the Cournot model, q  = 0, the
mark-up expression is reduced to  .
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monopoly, the mark-up equals  1
,
e











by using (4) and  () , iJ Pab qQ =+ + the reaction function of
firm i is linear to the outputs of other firms, and we have:






We now turn to the first stage of the game in which capital stock is
determined. It is noticeable that the firm’s equilibrium quantities defined by
the second-stage game are functions of its own capital and its rivals’ capital
in the first stage. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the second stage can be
represented by 
*(, ) , ii J qkK where KJ is the sum of the capital stocks of the
other firms. The fact that the capital is committed before the firm makes its
output decision implies that the firm can use its investment decision
strategically: the firm can influence its rivals’ outputs through its choice of
capacity. Given this specification, the profit of firm i in the first stage is:
Without loss of generality, we can omit the functional arguments “*” to
keep notation uncluttered. Thus, the corresponding first order condition for
each firm is given by
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effect of firm i’s capacity on its rivals’ outputs. Formally, we should write this














is firm i’s conjecture, or expectation,







is constant and is the same across the firms. In the subsequent empirical






to check if overinvestment is used to reduce the
output of rivals.






is evident if we bring the optimality
conditions of the first stage and the second stage together. The arrangement
could be done by substituting (6) into (8) and reducing (8) to,
Based on the propositions of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Roller and
Sickles (2000), (9) can be decomposed into two effects. By changing ki, firm
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stage-one investment on its cost. This effect cannot influence the output of
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corresponds to a one-stage simultaneous move quantity game. However, if








then the theoretical inferences
indicate a firm’s conjecture that a large capacity built in stage one can be used
strategically to reduce other firms’ outputs in stage two.
This strategic effect may come from different sources. For instance, in the
case of a cartel, the excess capacity could be used to discourage cheating
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behavior.6 This mechanism works through the channel that if cheating is
observed by the cartel, then all firms will produce at full capacity and revert
to competition. Subsequently, price collapses and many firms go bankrupt.
Thus, excess capacity could be used as a credible threat to enforce collusion,
and capital is endogenously determined in the first stage and affects the market
competition in the second stage. On the other hand, higher capacity can also
lead to lower short-run marginal cost, and thus to a smaller output by other
firms.7



















equilibrium () , i MR MC = which implies that capital price (ri) is larger than
its marginal revenue of product () .
k








caused by overinvestment in stage one leads to a misallocation
of resources in stage two.8
IV. Data, Empirical Specification and Estimation
- Data. As we have already mentioned in section II, TFTC (2001) contains
data about nine of ten major Taiwanese flour producers. The period that the
data set covered is between 1994 and 1998. Thus, we have 45 observations
for the regression analysis to be applied. The definitions of these variables
are listed in the Appendix. Basically, this article uses a set of panel data to
6 When there exists excess capacity, cartel members have an incentive to cheat and undercut
the collusive price, since they can take over a larger share of the market. Thus, traditional
IO theories believe that cartels break down for the sake of excess capacity. However, recent
game theoretic contributions, such as Osborne and Pitchik (1983, 1986, 1987) and Davidson
and Deneckere (1990), emphasize that the correlation between excess capacity and collusion
is positive rather than negative.
7 This is a usual result proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer (1985), and Roller and Sickles (2000).
8 This result is consistent with the findings of Eaton and Grossman (1984), Yarrow (1985),
Dixon (1986), and Roller and Sickles (2000). These models exhibit an asymmetry between
k and l that leads to a non-optimal capital-labor ratio. Although production is efficient in
the short-run, the strategic use of capital makes firms be not on their long-run cost functions.164 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
test the collusive behaviors among the dominant firms. The panel data can be
useful in some issues. First, it provides more available data, and increases the
degrees of freedom. Second, combining both cross-section and time-series
data can lessen the problem that occurs in the case of the omitted variables.
- Empirical Specification. Econometrically, we should deal with the above
model by simultaneously estimating the demand function (1) and optimality
conditions (6) and (9) from supply side. This approach needs to specify a
linear demand function such as P = a + bQ + cZ, in which P is the flour price,
Q is the industry output, and Z is a set of exogenous variables, so that we
could estimate the elasticity of demand e. As the span of data covers only 5
years, demand elasticity becomes very difficult -if not impossible- to be
estimated. Thus, we have selected a plausible parametric value for demand
elasticity to implement the nonlinear regression analysis. We use 1.0 as the
demand elasticity in the baseline specification. Furthermore, in order to make
the model persuasive, a sensitivity analysis will be performed to check the
robustness of the empirical result.
Since the model has to be imbedded within a stochastic framework for
empirical implementation, we assume that both equations (6) and (9) are
stochastic due to errors in optimization, where eli and e2i are error terms. We
now apply these two optimality conditions, obtained from the previous
theoretical framework, to test the market behavior of flour firms. First, rewrite
(6) as
Second, after some manipulations, (9) could be written as

























































be the elasticity to measure the impact of the individual
firm’s investment on its rivals’ output. We therefore have:






=  Additionally, we have the following
identity:
Since these functional forms are non-linear and involve a set of
relationships, we have to use a non-linear simultaneous-equations model to
estimate the relevant coefficients. In addition, it is inevitable for the panel
data to involve the correlations of the disturbances across equations. If we do
not take into account these correlations between the disturbances of different
structural equations, we are not using all the available information about each
equation, and therefore we do not attain asymptotical efficiency. This
insufficiency can be overcome by estimating all equations of the system
simultaneously, using non-linear three-stage least squares.
- Empirical Results: Using these functional forms, we try to estimate the system
of three equations (10) (11), and (12), which endogenize firm’s capital stock
(ki), firm’s output (qi), and industry output (Q), by non-linear three stage least
squares. The parameters to be estimated are q  and g, and the regression results
are the ones that appear on Table 2.
The main result obtained is that the baseline specification (e = 1.0) generates
the expected sign of q and g. For the measurement of market power (q) there
are enough evidences to suggest that flour firms monopolize the market through
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9 Since collusion happens in the second stage (market stage), using (6) is a standard approach
to compute the price-cost margin. Please refer to Roller and Sickles (2000) for details.
10 We compute the mark-up for the case of Cournot-Nash behavior by setting q  = 0.
(Cournot model) and -1 (perfect competition model). Since there are nine flour
firms in the sample, the result of q  = 7.58 approximates to n – 1 = 8 under
collusive regime. This implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis that firms
do work out some forms of concerted actions to monopolize the market, and
therefore our empirical evidences support the decision made by the TFTC.
By substituting the mean value of si, the estimate of q and e = 1 into (6),9
the estimated mark-up over marginal cost is equal to 55.8%, which is
substantially higher than the 6.5% that would hold if the market followed a
Cournot-Nash behavior.10 We therefore have a 49.3% increase in the mark-up
due to the collusion in the market.
For the effect of strategic investment which determines whether a two-
stage setup can be reduced to a single-stage model, the result exhibits a negative
and significant g  = -0.25. Capital stock being determined before the output
decision implies that an individual firm can use its investment decision
strategically. It conjectures that a 1% increase in capital investment could
reduce the outputs of its rivals by 0.25%. This encourages firms to increase
their capacity beyond the optimal level and, since new entry is artificially
precluded by the industry’s quota system, the excess capacity serves as an
instrument to discipline cartel members.
Empirical work by Rosenbaum (1989) also indicates that the correlation
Table 2. Empirical Results for Two-Stage Game, e     e     e     e     e    = 1. Non-Linear Three-
Stage Least-Squares Estimates
Coefficient Estimates Standard Deviation
q k7.58* 0.13
g - 0.25* 0.02
Notes: The estimate of g has been converted into an elasticity. The number of observations
is 45. * denotes that the estimates are significant at the level of 1%.167 STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND EXCESS CAPACITY
between a firm’s excess capacity and other firms’ output is negative. High
level of excess capacity could be used to punish deviators more harshly, since
firms will easily dump a large amount of product into the market. The collusive
agreement can therefore be enforced by a threat to revert to the Nash
equilibrium strategies by fixing the prices in a non-cooperative game with
the same given capacity.
V. Sensitivity Analysis
- Specification of demand elasticity. Because of data limitation, we have
selected a specific parametric value for demand elasticity (e = 1.0) to implement
the nonlinear regression analysis. Basically, this approach is a mixture of
simulation and estimation, hence there will always be some arbitrariness in
the choice of demand parameters. In this section, we use sensitivity analysis
to examine the robustness of our findings to alternative parameterizations of
the demand elasticity. The results are presented in Table 3.
Two aspects of these results deserve comment. First, if e is larger than 0.8,
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis
eq g
0.2 3,385.31 - 0.03*
0.4 5,588.78 - 0.06*
0.6 41,012.99 - 0.45*
0.8 8.13* - 0.23*
1.0 7.58* - 0.25*
1.2 5.09* - 0.23*
1.4 6.11* - 0.27*
1.6 7.12* - 0.30*
1.8 8.14* - 0.34*
2.0 9.15* - 0.37*
Notes: The estimate of g has been converted into an elasticity. The number of observations
is 45. * denotes that the estimates are significant at the level of 1%.168 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
the strategic effect (g) and the degree of collusiveness (q) have the expected
sign and are statistically significant. They are also robust to changes in e. The
estimated market conduct is between 5.09 and 9.15. All these estimated figures
are significantly different from zero (which is the corresponding Cournot-
Nash solution) and provide some evidences of cartel pricing.
Secondly, e  and  g moving in the same direction implies that the strategic
effect is evident in the elastic part of the demand schedule. Since high e means
high price and low market output in the case of a linear demand, cartel members
have an incentive to cheat and undercut the collusive price so that they can
take over a larger share of the market. The cartel may therefore need a more
severe threat to sustain the collusive equilibrium. Thus, a stronger strategic
effect to induce excess capacity and to work out a credible threat is a necessary
condition for the success of the cartel. Under this situation, the cartel could
inflict on deviators a larger damage by producing up to its capacity.
In addition, the fact that values of q are insignificantly different form zero
when e is less than 0.8 indicates that a monopolist is always reluctant to set
price in the inelastic part of the demand schedule, because, if e is large enough,
even a considerably small value of  i PM C
P
-  is consistent with collusion.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, a two-stage game model is set up to deal with the strategic
effect of the firm’s capital investment on its rivals’ outputs. The model is
tested with panel data from the Taiwanese flour industry. The empirical
evidences show that oligopolists expect that the long-term effects of their
capacity investment may act to deter its competitors’ outputs. This leads to
overinvestment in the first stage and causes the misallocation of resources.
Besides, the estimate of the conjectural variations also implies that firms do
work out some forms of concerted actions to monopolize the market.
Appendix. Data Description and Construction
1) P: While there are some different grades of flour, output is homogenous
across producers for any given grade. For the same grade of flour, price169 STRATEGIC INVESTMENT AND EXCESS CAPACITY
therefore tends to uniformity. The variable P is constructed as a Divisia price
index for the three types of flour sold in the market.
2) MCi: Since the production technology of flour is simple and firms use a
common technology, it is both convenient and realistic to assume constant
marginal costs, particularly during periods of considerable excess capacity.
We also assume that the marginal cost comprises the wage cost, the material
cost and other expenses for production.
3) ki and qi: The capacity of the individual firm (ki) is an average of year
capacity. Production (qi) is the actual yearly production.
4) si: Market share is defined as  . i q
Q
5) ri: Capital price is defined as r = kP (r + d – g), where kP is the price of the
capital, r is expected rate of return, d is the rate of depreciation and g is the
rate of capital gains. There are several ways to deal with g in the empirical
studies. In this article, we assume that flour firms do not care about the capi-
tal gains when they decide to invest in the first stage. Thus, the capital price is
redefined as r = kP (r + d). Since Taiwan CPI increased only by an annual rate
of 2.6% between 1994 and 1998, we omit g in the user cost expression and
get r = kP r + kP d.
6) The data of the opportunity cost (kP r) is obtained from Ma (2004a). All
the other data comes from the TFTC (2001) data set.
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